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CONSEQUENCE OF ANTICIPATED
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS-IS LOSS OF VALUE
A FACTOR?t
William Anderson*
As a practical matter, months and years usually elapse between
the time when preliminary plans for a particular project are announced by a public agency and the time when the summons initiating an action for condemnation of land required for the project
issues. During the intervening period, the inhabitants of the affected
area are usually aware of the nature and extent of the project and
if it is of a kind that would be injurious to the area, the fact of its
imminence hangs, as one writer has said, ". . . like the sword of
Damocles over the heads of the landowners. . .. "I This circumstance
cannot fail to diminish the value of their land. When the public
agency subsequently attempts to condemn the land required for the
project, should it receive the advantage of such a depreciation in
value, or should the extent of such depreciation be determined in
order that it may be restored to the landowner? During 1963, the
District Court of Appeals considered this question on two occasions
within the space of six months and reached disparate conclusions.
2 (decided by Division 2 of the
In City of Oakland v. Partridge
Second District on March 20, 1963), the court, referring to two
earlier cases, 8 held inadmissible evidence that the prospect of a
freeway had "blighted" the property in question and reduced its
income potential.4 To admit such evidence, the court said, would
6
be to indulge in "unfathomable speculation." 5 In People v. Lillard
(decided by the Third District on August 15, 1963) counsel for the
condemnee had asked a State right-of-way agent on cross-examination if the State had not been threatening to close various access
t The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the City of Mountain View, California.
* A.B., 1956. LL.B., 1959, University of California; Member, California Bar.
Assistant City Attorney, Mountain View, California.
1 4 NicHoLs, Law of Eminent Domain, § 12.3151 (Rev. 3d ed. 1962).
2 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1963).
3 People v. Lucas, 155 Cal. App. 2d 1, 317 P.2d 104 (1957); Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936).
4 214 Cal. App. 2d at 202-03, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
5 214 Cal. App. 2d at 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
6 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1964).
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openings and take portions of the property in question during the
previous 10 years. The lower court sustained an objection to the
question 7 and the court affirmed the ruling, but indicated, referring
to a recent case, 8 that if there had been some evidence of threatened
condemnation or of a depression in the market value "... (p)roperly
framed and with a foundation-laid inquiry, cross-examination of an
adverse witness on this subject would have been proper. '
Section 1249 of the CaliforniaCode of Civil Procedureprovides
that the measure of compensation for property taken in eminent
domain proceedings is to be the "actual value" of the property at
the time of the issuance of the summons, except that if the case is
not tried within one year of the commencement of the action and
the delay was not caused by the condemnee, the measure of damages shall be the "actual value" of the property at the time of the
trial.' It is well settled in California and elsewhere that "actual
value" is ordinarily measured by "market value,"" and that "market
value," in turn, is estimated with reference to the uses to which the
property is adapted. 2 The burden of proof of market value in California and most other jurisdictions is on the condemnee." Thus the
issue raised by the Partridgeand Lillard cases, cast in terms of applicable law, is: If an announcement of projected eminent domain
proceedings abridges the uses to which the subsequently condemned
land is adapted, may the condemnee introduce evidence of this
abridgment, so that it may be excluded as a factor in the determina7

219 Cal. App. 2d at 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 194.

8 Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 1 Cal. Rptr.

250 (1959).
9 219 Cal. App. 2d at 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
10 CAL. CODE CIv. Pgoc. § 1249 provides in part:
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages the right thereof
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the issuance of summons and
its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all
property to be actually taken and the basis of damages to property not
actually taken but injuriously affected, in all cases where damages are
allowed as provided in section one thousand two hundred forty-eight;
provided, that in any case in which the issue is not tried within one year
after the date of commencement of the action, unless the delay is caused
by the defendant, the compensation and damages shall be deemed to
have occurred at the date of the trial.
11 See, e.g., People v. LaMacchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 751, 264 P.2d 15, 24 (1953);
San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 68, 20 Pac. 372, 375 (1888);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379 (1945). See cases cited 4
NIcHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 12.1 n.12.
12 See, e.g., People v. LaMacchia, 40 Cal. 2d 738, 751, 264 P.2d 15, 24 (1956);
People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 425, 196 P.2d 570 (1948); Olsen v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See cases cited 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 12.314 n.1.
13 See, e.g., San Francisco v. Tilman Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 653-54, 272 Pac.
585, 586 (1928); People v. Thomas, 108 Cal. App. 2d 832, 840, 239 P.2d 914, 920
(1952). See cases cited 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 18.5 n.1.
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tion of market value? 14 Partridge has held that he may not, while
Lillard has indicated, arguably, that he may.
PRECEDENT

The PartridgeCase
Because Partridge relied, without comment, on two earlier
California cases, any discussion of its holding becomes, for all
practical purposes, a discussion of the cases which preceded it. A
review of precedent may, therefore, serve as a convenient point of
departure for the present discussion.
The cases referred to by the court in Partridge,Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac.15 and People v. Lucas,16 appear to have
been the only California cases, apart from Partridgeand Lillard, to
have considered the present problem. In Atchison, which was the
earlier of the two, the District Court of Appeals, held that testimony
relevant to a depreciation in value resulting from anticipation of
eminent domain proceedings was inadmissible. The court did not
refer to any authority in support of the precise proposition but
14 This problem is to be distinguished at the outset from the entirely different
problem arising where decline in value results from a protracted delay in instituting condemnation proceedings subsequent to the formulation of the original
plans. A loss resulting from such a delay will give rise to a personal cause of action
sounding in Tort, but is not an element to be considered in the determination of
market value. For an extensive discussion of this distinction see Gettelman Brewing
Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541, 542-46 (1944) and cases
cited therein. But see United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, 47
F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), discussed infra, in text accompanying note 24, where
the court apparently fails to recognize the distinction. Another distinguishable, but
deceptively similar problem, is that which arises where it is contended that a
depreciation in value of the land resulted from the fact that a pending eminent
domain action rendered the property unsaleable. It is abundantly clear that depredation of this character will be disallowed, since the notion of saleability is
implicit in the definition of market value. See discussion infra in text accompanying
note 41, Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 1 Cal. Rptr.
250 (1959). See generally 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 12.2 n.1.
15 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936), quoted in 1 ORGEL, Valuation
Under Eminent Domain Proceedings § 105 (2d ed. 1953). The court affirmed the
trial court's refusal to permit examination of witnesses on the question of the
depredation in value of land as a result of the commissioner's order authorizing the
condemnation on the ground that, to do so, would permit indulgence in "unfathomable speculation."
16 155 Cal. App. 2d 1, 317 P.2d 104 (1957). On cross-examination, the condemnees asked an expert witness of the condemnor if he knew that the State Highway
Commission, prior to the initiation of the action, had designated alternate routes for
the freeway in question, one of which would require the taking of the condemnees'
land. The witness answered that he had read about it. The condemnees then asked
the witness whether the possibility that the route selected might be one requiring
the condemnees' property would affect the development of the land on both sides
of the street upon which the condemnees' property was located. The court upheld
a ruling of the trial court sustaining an objection to this question.
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relied, instead, on the California Supreme Court case of San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Neale.17
Neale is one of a series of California decisions dealing with the
approximate converse of the present problem; i.e., the anticipated
eminent domain proceedings had resulted or would result"8 in an
appreciation in the value of the land. The California courts have
uniformly held that this appreciation may not be considered as
a factor in the calculation of market value.' 9
In referring to Neale, the court in Atchison said:
...[T]he case of San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale . . . expressly holds, ". . . it seems monstrous to say that the benefit arising

from the proposed improvement is to be taken into consideration as an
element of the value of the land." If the benefits may not be considered,
why consider the detriment? A value so derived is too remote and
20
speculative.

From this statement it seems patent that the court concluded that
logical consistency required that evidence of depreciation resulting
from anticipation of eminent domain proceedings should be excluded
in the determination of market value since evidence of appreciation
is excluded in the converse situation. 21 This is justified on the
ground that the detriment should not be "considered" if the benefit
is not. But, by refusing to admit evidence of depreciation in value
resulting from anticipation of eminent domain proceedings, the
Atchison case, in effect, permitted it to be "considered" as an element in the determination of market value. At the time of issuance
of the summons or commencement of the trial, the value of the
land would of course, have been diminished to the extent of such
depreciation. Unless the condemnee can introduce evidence of this
depreciation its amount cannot be determined and added to the
value of the property. If the amount of such depreciation is not
added to the value of the property, in light of the fact that the
burden of proof of the value of the land is on the condemnee, it
17 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372 (1888).

18 See the text infra for a discussion of the difference in the rationales of the
courts where it is contended that appreciation has taken place and where it is
contended that appreciation will take place in the future and the significance of this
difference as it reflects on the reasoning of the Partridge case.
'9 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372 (1888);
City
of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934); City of

Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 244 Pac. 609 (1926); cf. Los Angeles County
v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955).
20 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 518, 57 P.2d
575, 581 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
21 At 17 Cal. Jur. 2d 652 (1954) the same conclusion is implicit in the writer's
statement that ".

.

. the condemnation project or improvement as such is not a

factor to be considered in determining the market value of the land. ..

."
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cannot be effectively disallowed as an element in the determination
of market value. By contrast, the court need only exclude testimony
with respect to appreciation in the value of land as a consequence of
anticipated eminent domain proceedings in order to disallow such
appreciation as an element in the determination of market value.
If Atchison is consistent with Neale at all, it is so only in the
limited sense that both cases deny the admission of evidence of a
change in property values as a result of anticipation of eminent
domain. This apparent consistency results in a more fundamental
inconsistency in that Atchison permits the change in property values
to operate as a factor in valuation, whereas Neale does not. The
courts in other jurisdictions which have dealt with the problem have
concluded that disallowance of depreciation in value is the logical
22
converse of disallowance of appreciation.
It is submitted that the Atchison case is based on an incorrect
interpretation of the holding of the Supreme Court in Neale and that
2
it is, in reality, contrary to that holding. The Lucas case, unhappily, relied on Atchison as well as the Federal case of United States
24
v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands. Town of Highlands involved damages arising from a delay in prosecution of eminent
domain proceedings rather than from depreciation resulting from
their anticipation.2 5 This is a fundamentally different issue and the
22 In St. Louis v. MacAdras, 257 Mo. 448, 166 S.W. 307, 310 (1914) the court
said, "If, when property is taken in toto, as here, it be the rule that the owner
can have considered, as an element of his damages, the enhanced value of the property occasioned by a partial construction of the railroad, . . . then the converse
of the proposition should likewise be true; . . . if a partial construction of the
contemplated road and its incidents, above named, had depreciated the property
sought to be taken, then the railroad should have the benefit of such depreciation,
when it actually came to the taking of the property. No court would stand for
this latter rule, and yet it is the very converse of the one sought to be enforced here.
The proper rule, when the whole property is being taken, is not to allow the jury
to consider either enhancements or depreciations brought about by the construction
of the improvement for which the property is being taken." And in Brainerd v.
State, 74 Misc. 100, 131 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1911) it was said that, "Because the state
contemplates constructing an improvement it should not be made to pay for the
enhancement in the value of property that follows the anouncement or construction
of the improvement where it benefits property specially, nor should claimants be
made to suffer the damages resulting therefrom where it produces depreciation in
the value of property." In Conner v. Metropolitan Dist. Water Supply Comm.,
314 Mass. 33, 49 N.E. 593, 596 (1943), the court cites cases disallowing appreciation
resulting from anticipated eminent domain in support of its conclusion that depreciation would be similarly disallowed, see 4 NicuoLs, op. cit. supra note 1, § 12.3151(1)
n.20, where "appreciation" cases and "depredation" cases are cited for the proposition that ". . . in valuing the land the effect of the proposed improvement upon
the neighborhood is to be ignored."
23 People v. Lucas, 155 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6-7, 317 P.2d 104, 107 (1957).
24 47 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
the long lapse between time
25 The court in the Highlands case said, "...
tract . . . and the comthis
in
interest
an
evinced
publicly
when Congress first
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cases seem clearly distinguishable on their facts. 6 While Lucas indicated, in random fashion, a variety of reasons for upholding the
lower court's ruling" it adds little to the Atchison case.
It thus appears that the Partridgecase finds no real support in
California precedent and it becomes necessary to refer to other
jurisdictions in an effort to find support for it. It has previously been
suggested that cases wherein the condemnee is claiming that damages resulted from the condemnor's protracted delay in instituting
eminent domain proceedings are distinguishable. 8 One other factual
situation which has arisen in other jurisdictions is that wherein the
condemnee claims that the time of the preliminary announcement
should be regarded as the time of taking for the purpose of awarding interest on the damages. This claim has been consistently
denied,' but here, again, the facts are clearly distinguishable. The
condemnee in Partridgeand Lillard did not seek to have the day of
the preliminary announcement designated the day of the taking,"°
but rather that, at the time of the subsequent taking, the depreciation resulting from the preliminary announcement should be disallowed.
When these two factually dissimilar type of cases have been
distinguished, the remainder of authority in other jurisdictions is
mencement of these proceedings, may have thwarted the efforts of the claimant
fully to subdivide the tract. . . ." 47 F. Supp. at 937. However see 1 ORGEL, op. cit.
supra note 15 § 105 where the Highlands case is apparently regarded as authority
for the inclusion of depredation resulting from anticipation of eminent domain
proceedings as a factor in market value.
26 See discussion in note 14, supra. The court in the Highlands case seemed
unaware of the remedy discussed in the case of Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City
of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541, 542-46 (1944).
27 Four conceivable bases for the affirmance of the lower court ruling were
stated during the course of the Lucas opinion:
1. That the trial court has wide discretion regarding the scope of crossexamination so that the test on appellate review is not whether a specific
question should have been allowed but whether the scope, generally, has
been sufficiently broad, and in this instance, it was;
2. That the question was irrelevant in that it had no bearing on market
value but only on "development";
3. That the question was inadmissible in that it assumed facts not in
evidence;
4. That the question was inadmissible in that to allow evidence of the
depreciation of market value would result in an indulgence in speculation.
In support of the fourth basis the court merely refers to the Atchison and Highlands
cases without the formality of an independently reasoned conclusion. The third
basis was merely referred to without comment as one of the objections "to the
question in the trial court." 155 Cal. App. 2d at 6-7, 317 P.2d at 107. However,
it assumes new significance in light of the holdings in the Lillard case discussed
infra, in text accompanying note 60.
28 See note 14 supra.
29 See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283-85 (1939).
80 Such a contention would be precluded, in any event, by the clear wording
of section 1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see note 5 supra.
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apparently uniform in disallowing depreciation resulting from anticipated eminent domain proceedings in determining the value of
the property condemned."' This is the rule whether the preliminary
designation specifically included the property ultimately taken,
included it in the alternative, or merely referred to the neighborhood
in general terms.3 2 Thus, it would seem that the holding in Partridge
finds no real support in precedent.
The Lillard Case
The court in the Lillard case, in its discussion of the present
problem, begins by conceding, curiously, that:
. . . there appears to be a conflict of authority on whether "market
value" is still the yardstick of just compensation when it is established
that a depressed market for the property is created by a proposed con-

demnation. 33

As authority for this proposition, the court cites Orgel's treatise on
valuation in eminent domain.34
In the first place, it is at least arguable that the reasoning of
in those cases where depreciation in value has occurred
courts,
the
as a consequence of a proposed condemnation, may be more appropriately understood as a refinement of the market value concept6
than a departure from it."5 Further, a perusal of Orgel's text
reveals that the very cases on which the author relies to establish this
81 See, e.g., Lower Nueces River Dist. v. Collins, 357 S.W.2d 449, (Tex. Ct.
App., 1962); State Dept. Highway v. Clarke, 135 So. 2d 329, (La. App. 1961);
Hermann v. North Pa. R.R., 270 Pa. 551, 113 Atl. 828 (1921); Brainerd v. State,
74 Misc. Rep. 100, 131 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1911); cf. State Road Dept. v. Chicone,
148 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1962). The case of Lower Nueces River Dist. v. Collins, supra,
is particularly interesting if only because it illustrates the reductio ad absurdum
of the Partridge rule. The land in that case, consisted of three islands which were
to be immersed by virtue of the proposed project. In light of the imminence of
the project they were worthless and under the rule of the Partridge case the condemnee would not have been entitled to any compensation.
32 In the converse situation, where appreciation in value has occurred, some
courts apparently distinguish between specific and general designation; disallowing
appreciation in the former and allowing it in the latter. See, United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 376-79 (1942). See generally, 4 NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 15,
§§ 100-103. The courts have refused to make this distinction where depreciation has
resulted, however, apparently because of the danger manifest in a rule which would
permit the condemnor to lower market values by announcing his intention to erect
an offensive structure in the general neighborhood of the land subsequently to be
condemned. See State v. Burnett, 24 N.J. 280, 131 A.2d 765 (1957), Brainerd v. State,
74 Misc. Rep. 100, 131 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1911).
33 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1963).
34 1 OROEL, op. cit. supra note 15, § 105.
its
35 The courts seem to say, in effect, that the value of the land shall be
market value with respect to those uses to which it would be adapted but for the
proposed project. See cases cited in note 31, supra.
36 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 15, §§ 105-06.
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"conflict of authority" are none other than Atchison and United
States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands.8" It has been previously suggested that the latter is distinguishable8 8 and the former
incorrectly decided. 89
Having conceded this "split of authority" however, the court,
in the Lillard case goes on to observe that:
... at least one California case has said that the trial court could have,
within the limitations of sound legal and equitable principles, advised
the jury that they should treat the property as having the value that
it would have had, had no preliminary action been taken by the board
toward the acquisition of the property. 40

This case is Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp."' It
should be noted at the outset that Buena Park is distinguishable
from both Partridge and Lillard. The condemnee, in Buena Park,
did not contend that depreciation had resulted from the anticipation
of eminent domain proceedings. Rather, the condemnor contended
that evidence concerning the value of the land in question for subdivision purposes should not have been received because, in light
of the pending condemnation action, the land had become unsaleable
for those purposes.4" The court held such evidence admissible stating, in effect, that the notion of saleability is implicit in the definition
of market value. 48 Although thus distinguishable, the broad dictum of
Buena Park served as a useful predicate for the Lillard case and,
when it is considered in conjunction with the cases decided in other
jurisdictions,44 it seems clear that the Lillard case finds significant
support in precedent.
RATIONALE

Just Compensation
Any attempt to rationalize the Partridgeand Lillard cases must
begin with a consideration of the constitutionality of the holding of
the Partridge case. A rule which would permit the condemnor to
depress the value of property by the announcement of a plan to erect
an offensive structure and then acquire the property at a reduced
value would seem to violate the "Just Compensation" provision of
37 47 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
8 See note 14 supra.
89 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
40 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1963).
41 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1959).
42 Id. at 258, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 253. Because the condemnation action
had been
filed, the county recorder would not accept the final subdivision map.
48 Id. at 258-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
44 See cases cited in note 31 supra.
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the eminent domain section of the California Constitution. 45 The
court, in Partridge, as well as in Atchison and Lucas, however,
seemed unaware of this possibility.
Significantly, when it was contended before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court 46 that a statute requiring damages to be fixed at the
value of the property "before the taking" violated the Massachusetts
"Just Compensation" provision 47 because it permitted the inclusion
of depreciation resulting from anticipation of the proposed improvement in the determination of market value, the court interpreted
"before the taking" to mean "damages shall be based upon the
value of the land unaffected by the improvements" to obviate the
constitutional objection. Implicit in the court's ruling is its recognition of the fact that if the statute were interpreted to permit such
depreciation to operate as an element in the determination of market value, it would have been unconstitutional.48
Why did the court in Partridgefail to anticipate this problem?
Perhaps because it relied on the Atchison case and the court in
Atchison, felt that depreciation, in this context, could be disallowed
by the process of excluding such evidence when, in fact, the exclusion of such evidence resulted in the inclusion of such depreciation
as an element of market value. In all events this constitutional problem poses a serious objection to the Partridgeholding.
"Unfathomable Speculation"
The court, in Partridge,quoting from Atchison indicated that,
to admit evidence of depreciation in value of land as a consequence
of anticipated eminent domain would be to indulge in "unfathomable
speculation.1 49 The apparent theory is that a decline in market
value subsequent to the preliminary announcement can result from
the interaction of many factors and that it is impossible to isolate
the anticipation of eminent domain as one of these and assign a
portion of the decline to it.50
45 CALt.
CONST. art. 1 § 14 provides, in part, "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been
made to, or paid into court for, the owner ... "
46 Conner v. Metropolitan Dist. Water Supply Comm., 314 Mass. 33, 49 N.E.2d
593, 596 (1943).
47 MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 10, § 11.
48 See also Herman v. North Pa. R.R. Co., 270 Pa. 551, 113 Atl. 828, 829 (1921),
where the concern of the court over "illegal compensation . . . feebly disguised"
suggests that it is anticipating a constitutional problem.
49 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1963). This same language
from the Atchison case was quoted by the court in People v. Lucas, 155 Cal. 2d 1, 6,
317 P.2d 104, 107.
50 It is interesting, in this context, to note that in the Atchison case, the announcement of the project occurred prior to and the initiation of the action sub-
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In the converse situation, where appreciation has resulted from
the anticipation of eminent domain, the California courts have had
little difficulty in determining what portion of the appreciation is
attributable to the anticipation of eminent domain for the purpose
of excluding such evidence. They circumvent the objection of "unfathomable speculation" by the expedient of stating the portion of
appreciation attributable to the anticipation in terms of the increased uses to which the land becomes adapted as a consequence
of the condemnation plans. 5'
To illustrate the above, the City of Pasadena v. Union Trust
Co.,2 the highest use to which land was adapted in the hands of the
condemnee was as a cabin site. The condemnor proposed to use the
land, in conjunction with other land previously acquired, for a
reservoir, and the condemnee sought to have the market value
estimated with reference to the higher use of the land as a reservoir
site, even though it would not have been practicable for him to
acquire the additional land necessary to put the land to this use. It
was held that the damages were to be measured in terms of the current market value of land in that vicinity adapted for use as a cabin
site. By first excluding evidence of the increase in available uses
resulting from anticipation of eminent domain and then determining
the value of the land for the uses to which it was adapted in the
hands of the condemnee in terms of current market value, the court
effectively isolated appreciation resulting from anticipation of
eminent domain as a factor. Additionally the court precluded the
disallowance of appreciation resulting from other elements reflected
in general economic conditions since these elements are, of necessity,
reflected in the current market value of land for whatever use.
It would seem logical that this valuation process should apply
inversely to the facts of the Partridge case and that the damages
should be assessed in terms of the current market value of land for
uses to which it was adapted in the hands of the condemnee without
reference to the abridgment of those uses resulting from the anticipation of eminent domain proceedings. The courts in other
jurisdictions have applied this formula in effect, if not in terms. 58
sequent to the great depression of 1929, a circumstance which may instinctively have
prompted the court's conclusion in this regard.
51 City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934);
City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 244 Pac. 609 (1926) ; Cf. Los Angeles
County v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955).
52 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934).
53 See, e.g., Brainerd v. State, 74 Misc. 100, 131 N.Y. Supp. 221, 226 (1911),
where the court says, "...
the claimants are entitled to have their premises valued
before the appropriation by reference to the condition in which they were at that
time with the use of the dock and the old canal.... ." In Hermann v. North Pa. R.R.
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On the facts of Partridge,it is obvious that the condemnees could
not have their land valued with reference to its use as a highway
site since it was not adapted to that use prior to the announcement
of the condemnation plans. Conversely, it would seem that they
should have been permitted to offer evidence tending to show that,
prior to the announcement of the condemnation plans, their land
was adapted to certain long term uses which the character of the
proposed project rendered unfeasible. 4
The question remains: Why did the court in the Partridgecase
and the Atchison case fail to apply inversely the proof formula used
in the "appreciation" cases? Obviously, Partridgedid not apply this
formula because Atchison, upon which it relied, did not. Atchison
did not apply the formula because, it is submitted, the court erroneously interpreted the Neale case on which it relied.
The Neale case dealt with two fundamentally different questions. The first of these was whether the anticipated eminent domain
proceedings had resulted in an appreciation in value. 5 The court
answered in the negative saying that there had been no increase in
uses to which the land was adopted as a consequence of the anticipated proceedings but clearly indicated that, if there had been
an increase in prospective uses, evidence thereof would be inadmissible. The court considered such evidence inadmissible not because
it would be speculative,"6 but because the consequence of the admission would be to require the condemnor to pay for the appreciation
in value attributable to his announcement of the projected improvement5
The second problem dealt with in Neale was whether the erection of the proposed improvement would result in a future appreciation in the value of the land.5 8 The court refused to admit
Co., 270 Pa. 551, 113 Atl. 828, 829 (1921) the court states, "When the appropriation takes place this 'impairment of value' from these preliminary steps becomes
merged, as it were, in the damages then payable; the matter being worked out
practically in assessing the damages by simply ignoring the detrimental effect of
the plotting and treating the property as though there had been no harmful results."
54 In the Partridge case there was some indication that, in light of the
anticipated proceedings, the property had become unsuitable for use with respect
to business rentals. 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 202-03, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1963).
55 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 372 (1888).
50 The court says, generally, that permitting proof of the prospective use in
question was not ". . . sanctioning a remote or speculative value. It was merely
taking the present value for the prospective purposes." Id. at 71, 20 Pac. 372, 376.
57 The case of City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21,
31 P.2d 463 (1934) previously referred to (see note 15, supra) as an illustration of
the disallowance of appreciation by exclusion of evidence of increased uses, relies
on the case of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 244 Pac. 609 (1926) which in
turn relies extensively on this portion of the Neale opinion.
58 78 Cal. 63, 73-76, 20 Pac. 372, 377-78 (1888).
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evidence tending to show that a general increase in land values
would result from the completion and operation of the improvement
on the grounds that it was "remote and speculative."
The problem which arose in Atchison is clearly the converse of
the first problem considered in Neale; i.e., whether the anticipated
eminent domain proceedings had resulted in a depreciation in value.
If the court had analogized from the first portion of Neale, it would
have concluded that evidence of a decrease in prospective uses
should be admitted, since it is neither remote nor speculative. This
would prevent the condemnor from taking advantage of the depreciation in value attributable to his announcement of the projected
improvement. The court, however, analogized instead, from the
second portion of the Neale opinion dealing with evidence of appreciation which would occur in the future as a result of the erection
of the improvement to conclude that evidence of depreciation which
had occurred in the past as a result of the anticipation of eminent
domain proceedings was inadmissible because it was "speculative. 5 9
It thus appears that the reasoning of Atchison was incorrect in
this regard and that to admit evidence of depreciation in value as
a consequence of anticipated eminent domain proceedings would not
require indulgence in "unfathomable speculation," but merely the
application of a fairly simple rule of thumb.
A Proper Foundation
It has been suggested that the holding of Partridgeis constitutionally suspect and that the argument that to admit evidence of
depreciation in value attributable to anticipated eminent domain
proceedings would be to indulge in "unfathomable speculation" is
of dubious merit. It follows, therefore, that the rule of Lillard rather
than that of Partridgeis the more reasonable.
The Lillard case did not involve an attempt by the condemnee
to introduce evidence of a depreciation in value in his own behalf.
Rather, counsel for the condemnee had attempted to elicit such information from a witness on cross-examination. 60 The conclusion of
59 This fact is apparent from the face of both the Neale and the Atchison
cases, for the court in the latter quotes a portion of the former and states, ". . . It
seems monstrous to say that the benefit arising from the proposed improvement is
to be taken into consideration as an element in the value of the land." San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 75, 20 Pac. 372, 377 (1888) quoted in Atchison
T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 518, 57 P.2d 575, 581
(1936). The court in Atchison is apparently overlooking the fact that it is dealing
not with "benefit arising from the proposed improvement" but rather with appreciation resulting from anticipation of condemnation for the erection of the
proposed improvement.
60 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 376-77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194-95 (1963).
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the court that such evidence would be admissible on direct examination seems implicit in the court's ruling that the question would not
have been objectionable had a proper foundation been laid since
the business of laying the foundation would
presumably have in61
volved an offer of evidence or of proof.
Thus the Lillard case seems to have pointed the way to the
admission of evidence of this character in future cases.
CONCLUSION

As land becomes more scarce, as land values continue to rise
and as condemning agencies move ever further afield in quest of
land necessary for their projects, the possibility of depreciation in
the value of land resulting from anticipation of eminent domain
proceedings becomes greater. It has been suggested that, as between
the Partridge case, which held evidence of such depreciation inadmissible, the Lillard case, which indicated that such evidence was
admissible, the latter represented the better rule.
Perhaps in the near future a California court will have occasion
to consider these cases together and to overrule or disapprove
Partridge.Until that time, the Partridgecase, along with the cases
upon which it relied, will remain as a skeleton in the already well
populated closet of California precedent.
61 Because witnesses for the condemnor may not always be able to testify
with respect to the effect of the proposed project or to a depression in values attributable to it, it may be difficult for counsel for the condemnee to lay the
appropriate foundation on cross-examination and he may wish to ask leave of
court, either to call his own witnesses out of order for this purpose, or to recall
the condemnor's witness for further cross-examination at the conclusion of his own
case.

